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Revolutions have always attracted the interest 
of scholars from several disciplines, such as 
history, sociology, political sciences or philoso-
phy, for obvious reasons: the study of revolu-
tions allows scholars to examine, explain and 
think about significant historical changes. The 
revolutions in France, Russia or China raise 
questions regarding the breakdown of politi-
cal systems, economic models and social re-
lations and the establishment of new societies. 
The study of revolutions has flourished since 
the 1960s, after the outbreak of anticolonial and 
revolutionary movements in the so-called third 
world, especially after the revolution in Cuba and 
the Vietnam war. Eventually, because these rev-
olutions were contemporary, they were studied 
mostly by social and political scientists (rather 
than historians), who turned to the revolutions 
of the past (notably the French and Russian) in 
order to examine differences and construct ex-
planatory comparative models. Thus, historians 
who wish to study theories of revolutions have 
to take into account a large body of literature 
from the social and political sciences.
This article reviews the literature on revolution 
in the social and political sciences and it is di-
vided into two sections. In the first section, I will 
discuss the theories of revolutions that were de-
veloped from the 1960s to the 1980s. As I will 
show, from the 1990s onwards there have been 
significant changes in the study of revolutions, 
which I will address in the second section of this 
article. The disappointment with revolutions 
(especially after the Iranian revolution) and the 
collapse of the communist regimes in Europe 
played an important role in the reorientation of 
the discussion on revolutions. On the one hand, 
the study of revolutions as complex social and 
political phenomena was to a large extent re-
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placed by the study of civil wars, and violence became the prevalent analytical tool in the studies of 
revolutionary situations and civil wars, among political scientists in particular. On the other hand, 
revolutions became the subject of social movement theorists and, thus, they were studied from 
the revolutionary movements perspective rather than as successful sociopolitical transformations. 
For social movement and collective action theorists, revolutions should be studied within the larger 
framework of sociopolitical conflicts that also include protest movements, riots, uprisings, politi-
cal violence and civil wars. 
The first theoretical approaches on revolutions were developed on the grounds of the criticism of 
truisms regarding the causes of revolutions, some of which are very common even today, such 
as, for instance, that the increasing poverty and destitution of the population lead to revolutions or 
that revolutions occur in a specific phase of capitalist development when the relations of produc-
tion inhibit the development of productive forces. Although a number of academic studies of rev-
olution appeared as early as the 1920s in the United States, it was in the postwar era that these 
studies mushroomed.2 In the 1960s, new theories of revolution were put forward that focused on 
the changes and reactions that the introduction of capitalism brought to less-developed, agrar-
ian countries. These studies did not address the question of revolution per se but studied revolu-
tion within the broader framework of the different “paths to modernity”. One of the first and most 
important studies in that direction was the seminal study by Barrington Moore Jr entitled Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Adopting a comparative approach, Moore suggested that 
the “moment” of revolution was the period of transition to capitalist agriculture, when the relations 
between the social classes and the state were changing. Unsuccessful commercialisation of ag-
riculture produced cleavages and conflicts between landowners and peasants that, under certain 
conditions (regarding the weakening of the ties between landowners and peasants, class differ-
ences among the peasants, the level of solidarity within peasant communities and the possibility 
of forming broader class alliances), could lead peasants to start a revolution.3 Two years later, an-
other pathbreaking book, Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies, was published. 
Huntington’s main argument was that revolutions happen when traditional political structures and 
institutions fail to integrate or assimilate new groups that are mobilised into politics. The moderni-
sation and industrialisation that accompany capitalism, the spread of education, the emergence of 
a working class and the impoverishment of peasants bring to the fore political forces and social 
groups that challenge the regime and demand participation in the political system. Political mobi-
lisation, thus, destabilises a political system unwilling or unable to change.4 
Eric Wolf’s Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century was in the same direction, i.e. the study of the 
impact of modernisation on traditional peasant societies, but offered an altogether different ap-
proach to revolutions. Whereas Moore and Huntington studied revolution as one possible outcome 
of modernisation (along with democracy, dictatorship and various types of “praetorianism”), Wolf 
focused exclusively on contemporary peasant revolutions. He argued that the introduction of capi-
talism in agriculture transformed peasants into market-oriented farmers and, as a consequence, 
traditional power mechanisms were questioned and the role of the elites in local communities as 
mediators between the peasant and the wider society was undermined. As traditional peasant so-
ciety disintegrated under the impact of capitalism, the middle peasantry was radicalised and mo-
bilised (and not the poor or the landless peasants who were dependent on big landowners for their 








livelihood). The middle peasantry became a political actor because it saw its position threatened 
by the advance of capitalism in agriculture, was independent of the landowners and had close ties 
with the cities, the hotbeds of radical ideas. Herein, Wolf argued, lies a crucial paradox: in his at-
tempt to defend traditional ways from the changes that capitalism imposed, the middle peasant 
became a revolutionary.5 
The study of revolutionary movements and politics was further developed by Charles Tilly,6 who fo-
cused on the political subjects by putting forward a theory of collective action, which can be viewed 
also as an early phase of his larger, life-time project on “contentious politics”. According to Tilly, rev-
olution is a conflict between (at least) two power blocs that claim to control the state by mobilising 
part of the populace. His analysis stresses the advent of capitalism, state-building and wars as the 
structural conditions for revolutions, but he is also interested in the subjective, historically specific 
conditions of the contenders for power. Therefore, he analyses revolution as a relation and a proc-
ess: how discontent is transformed into mobilisation and then into an organised bid for power in 
a situation where control of the state and political legitimacy is contested. In a revolutionary situa-
tion, the two power blocs advance mutually exclusive claims for political power and its outcome is 
dependent on the ability of the contenders to mobilise people and resources. 
In the late 1970s Theda Skocpol published a study on revolutions that remains the most influential 
in the field. In States and Social Revolutions, she proposed a structuralist approach to revolutions, 
which was radically different from the works mentioned above. Her analysis did not focus on the 
revolutionary subject (its goals, organisation or ideology) but on the “structural” relations and objec-
tive conditions, i.e. class relations, the state and the international context. At the heart of her analy-
sis is the thesis on the potential autonomy of the state. Against the prevalent idea that the develop-
ment of revolutionary movements may cause a crisis of the state, she argued the opposite, namely 
that the crisis of the state is the precondition for the emergence of revolutionary movements. More 
specifically, she argued that revolutionary crises occurred “when the old-regimes states became 
unable to meet the challenges of evolving international situations … [a]nd they were constrained or 
checked in their responses by the institutionalised relationships of the autocratic state organisa-
tions to the landed upper classes and the agrarian economies”.7 Under such historical conditions, 
she continues, state authority, and the army in particular, falls apart, creating opportunities for rev-
olutionary movements to overthrow the regime. Skocpol’s seminal study has become a classic in 
the theoretical discussion of revolutions, as well as in the social sciences in general, in the United 
States because it marked a turn to the systematic study of the state (what sociologists at the time 
called “bringing the state back in”). 
While these studies, Skocpol’s in particular, set the framework of the debates and theoretical dis-
cussions on revolution in the 1980s, since the 1990s there have been developments in new direc-
tions. As it is often the case, the starting point was the flaws in the theoretical approaches that had 
been advanced. The most interesting debate concerned Skocpol’s study and it was more generally 
related to the critique of the so-called “second wave” of American sociologists. The critique con-
cerned three aspects of her work: first, the comparative-historical method (sociologists criticised 
Skocpol for not being theoretical and abstract enough, while historians maintained that the search 
for general models pulverised the particularities of each case); second, her structuralist approach, 
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which did not take agency into account in explaining revolutions; and, last, that by putting the em-
phasis on class relations and modes of production she overlooked the role of culture.8 
At the same time in the 1990s, there was a significant shift in the study of revolutions as they be-
came more and more connected with civil wars and the question of violence. For a number of 
scholars, mainly political scientists, violence became the vantage (and for some the sole) point for 
the study of revolutions. This shift was interrelated with broader historical and political changes. 
First, after the end of the cold war, the number of wars, and of civil wars in particular, increased 
dramatically. The outbreak of the civil war in Yugoslavia (the first war on the continent since 1945), 
the wars in the former Soviet republics, the proliferation of wars in Africa, as well as the discus-
sion on “ethnic cleansing”, put the question of violence high on the agenda of public and academic 
discussion. Second, the collapse of the communist regimes in 1989 challenged leftist ideas and ex-
pectations. To begin with, the collapse of the Eastern bloc was a theoretical challenge for students 
of revolutions. Did 1989 represent a type of revolution, and more to the point, a new type of revolu-
tion since it was not marked by the use of violence, a common characteristic of all revolutions until 
then? Moreover, and most importantly, the collapse of communist regimes dramatically changed 
the ideological and intellectual environment. The disappointment stemming from the failure of 
“real-existing socialism” (and even before that, the terrible outcome of the Iranian revolution) cast 
a new, unfavourable light on the idea (and expectations) of revolution. As it became increasingly 
associated with violence and repression, the concept of revolution acquired only negative conno-
tations. Even the French revolution did not escape from this intellectual trend as Jacobinism was 
more or less regarded as the harbinger of the Soviet gulag.9
The shift from the study of revolutions to the study of civil wars highlighted a crucial problem: it 
identifies revolutions with civil wars. Most social revolutions at one point or another were caus-
ally related to civil wars (for instance in Russia, China or Nicaragua). However, the opposite is also 
true as many civil wars were caused not by a revolutionary change in society but a violent power 
conflict between two rival groups which had no interest in social of political change (for instance 
in Rwanda, Sierra Leone or Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein). The identification of revolution 
with civil war led scholars to downplay the specific political, ideological and cultural characteristics 
of revolutionary movements; violent conflicts during revolutions were stripped of any ideological 
and political content and were associated with strategies of domination and tactics of warfare. At 
the same time, the study of violence opened new areas of research. Social and political scientists 
moved away from the study of the causes of revolutions and civil wars to the ways they were con-
ducted, and to the characteristics and the tactics of the power contenders in a violent conflict. In-
stead of a static view of classes and the state that the structuralist approach assumed, scholars 
suggested a more dynamic approach in their explanation of social revolutions, taking into account 
the impact of events, specific circumstances and contingency; some scholars sought to combine 
macrohistorical comparative analyses with field research at the microlevel; violence was no long-
er regarded as a simple consequence of civil war or revolution but the different forms of violence 
were explained by the intentions and composition of the belligerents. 
In the last decade a large part of the literature on civil wars and revolutions has come from the 
political sciences and follows the rational choice theory. Stathis Kalyvas, in his book The Logic of 








Violence in Civil War, examines the instrumental use of violence in civil wars, namely violence as 
a means of control and coercion of the population by the conflicting parties. The support of the 
population either for the insurgents or the government is not dependent on class interests, politi-
cal beliefs or cultural backgrounds but rather on the level of control that each side exerts over the 
population. The higher and more permanent the control, the greater the degree of support and col-
laboration, and therefore, less violence is used. On the contrary, in contested areas the conflicting 
parties use violence in order to coerce the population to collaborate with them (by providing infor-
mation, enlisting in the armed forces, etc). Accordingly different forms of violence are used: selec-
tive violence occurs when control is complete and the flow of information (from denouncers who 
consider it safe) allows for selective targeting; indiscriminate violence is used to generate civilian 
compliance when control is limited and, thus, collaboration (and the providing of information) una-
vailable.10 A similar theoretical model is used for resource mobilisation. Anthony Oberschall and 
Michael Seidman argue that in revolutionary situations, the conflicting parties use the control of 
food procurement to compel the civilian population and soldiers to support them. The winner in a 
revolution or civil war “is the side that uses coercion most intelligently and manipulates food short-
age most efficiently”.11 In a similar vein, Jeremy Weinstein argues that the violence of insurgent 
groups in Uganda, Mozambique and Peru is to a large extent conditioned by economic resources. 
Individuals participate in a rebel group after estimating the costs and benefits and, therefore, the re-
cruitment strategies of the rebel leaders are based on offering incentives for participation. Groups 
with access to economic resources offer material incentives to the individuals; these groups at-
tract opportunists, lack disciplining mechanisms and use widespread violence against civilians. On 
the contrary, rebel groups without access to economic resources draw on “social endowments” 
to recruit individuals and use ethnic, religious or ideological ties to mobilise the populace; these 
groups attract committed individuals, develop mechanisms of discipline and control and employ 
violence selectively.12 
These approaches have enriched the discussion on revolutions, by setting a number of variables 
that determine the development of revolutions and explain the different levels and types of vio-
lence. However, they also have drawbacks. The first is that these approaches assume that sub-
jects are highly individualised, act rationally and are motivated by personal gain. Other factors that 
may determine individual behaviour and decisions such as culture, habitus, emotions or class are 
downplayed. Rational choice studies analyse the actions of the subject from the point of view of the 
modern, western, utilitarian idea of the self, rather than within the framework of non-western, tra-
ditional, rural societies where these movements occurred.13 The second drawback of these studies 
is that the subject “evaporates”, because its actions are conditioned by the choices of the warring 
leaders. Revolutions and civil wars are ultimately caused by warlords and party leaders who co-
erce the populace to take part in a conflict and to choose sides. The action of the subject, that is the 
thousands of people who participate in revolutions and civil wars, is explained by and restricted to 
the intentions and purposes of a determined minority. 
Other scholars of revolutions have followed different paths. Under the impact of the “cultural turn” 
in the social sciences and in an attempt to overcome the dichotomy between structure and agency 
that dominated earlier studies of revolution, a number of political scientists and sociologists rein-
vigorated the study of revolution. Many studies turned to the question of agency in revolutionary 
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movements and focused on values, ideas and emotions as explanatory factors for popular mobili-
sation. A good example of this new approach was Elisabeth Wood’s study of FMLN guerrillas in El 
Salvador. Wood sought to explain the population’s support for the guerrillas in the context of high 
risk. She overcame the limitations of the rational choice approach by focusing on the emotions and 
values of the peasants and the changes in political culture that the guerrilla groups brought about. 
To cite just one example of the role that emotions can play, Wood argues that one of the reasons 
for peasant participation in the insurgent activities was the “pleasure in agency”, that is “the posi-
tive affect associated with self-determination, autonomy, self-esteem, efficacy, and pride that come 
from the successful assertion of intention”.14 The role of emotions in revolutionary activism is high-
lighted by other scholars too. Michael Kimmel, in his theoretical treatise of revolution, identifies 
two emotions as primary sources of popular motivation to participate in a revolution: the combi-
nation of despair and hope.15 A more nuanced analysis of the role of emotions is offered by Jean-
Pierre Reed, who, using the development of the FSLN movement in Nicaragua in the 1970s as a 
case-study, suggests that certain events provoke emotional responses that create the necessary 
context for the making of a successful revolution. These emotions are, on the one hand, the moral 
outrage at state-driven events that delegitimise the government (like arbitrary repression), and, 
on the other, the hope generated by the successes of the revolutionary movement which make a 
future popular victory and the overthrow of the regime credible.16
A group of sociologists influenced by Skocpol and Tilly sought to combine structuralist/state-cen-
tred approach with collective action/social movement theories. At the one end of this group of 
scholars is Jeff Goodwin, who suggested a state-centred approach for the analysis of revolutionary 
movements. He argued that revolutionary movements were the result of violent and exclusionary 
state policies, and more specifically of a combination of unpopular economic policies, repression, 
indiscriminate violence, corrupt rule and weak policing capacities. While he acknowledged the limi-
tations of the state-centred approach, namely the importance of factors such as organisational ca-
pability, resource mobilisation and the role of beliefs and emotions, he claimed that state practices 
are the most decisive element and the explanatory factor in the formation of revolutionary move-
ments.17 Timothy Wickham-Crowley moved away from the state-centred approach by taking into 
account, on the one hand, the social structure and, on the other, the practices both of the govern-
ments and guerrillas to gain popular support. He argued that the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolu-
tions were successful because the guerrillas managed to build up strong and sustained peasant 
support, maintain their military strength, and, most importantly, replaced the authority and legiti-
macy of the state by creating protostate institutions and providing the peasantry with various social 
services (health, education, local administration, etc).18 John Foran suggested a multicausal theory 
of revolutions with an emphasis on the strategy of the movements. According to him, there are 
five interrelated factors that are necessary for a successful revolution: dependent development, a 
repressive state, a political culture of opposition, economic crisis and “world-systemic” disruption. 
Perhaps the most novel characteristic of his model was the “political cultures of opposition”, a set 
of ideas and values that allowed people to make sense of their world and at the same time formed 
the basis of interclass alliances and revolutionary coalitions. “Political cultures of opposition,” he 
writes, “may draw upon diverse sources: formal ideologies, folk traditions and popular idioms, 
ranging from ideas and feelings of nationalism (against control by outsiders), to socialism (equal-
ity and social justice), democracy (demands for participation and an end to dictatorship), or eman-








cipatory religious appeals (resistance to evil and suffering).”19 The “political cultures of opposition” 
reflected the impact of the cultural turn on the social sciences. From this viewpoint, Foran’s work, 
among others, is representative of the last generation in theories of revolution that pay particular 
attention to the cultural and subjective aspects of revolutionary movements.20 
The most radical culturalist approach came from Eric Selbin. He claims that myth, memory and 
mimesis shape people’s imaginary, help them to make sense of their world and are the driving 
forces of collective action for social change. Myth, memory and mimesis encoded in narratives, 
like stories, songs, fables, etc, transmitted from generation to generation and from one place or 
country to another, form people’s consciousness and culture in their struggle against power. Selbin 
differentiates between four types of revolution stories: the civilising and democratising story, the 
social revolution story, the freedom and liberation story, and the “lost and forgotten” revolution 
story. Challenging the dichotomy between fact and fiction and focusing on the ideas and emotions 
of people, he examines narratives not simply as discursive representations or reconstructions but 
also as catalysts for collective action.21 
In Greek historiography the concept of revolution is used mainly in the context of the Greek revo-
lution of 1821. Unfortunately, the interest and research by historians on the revolution has been 
waning in recent decades. Nonetheless, the traditional nationalist historiography of the revolution 
has been heavily criticised and the few recent studies point to new areas of research on the topic, 
like the role of elites or local-ethnic aspects. Yet, a theoretical analysis of the Greek revolution in the 
broader, comparative perspective of the nineteenth-century national movements in the Balkans 
and elsewhere in Europe is still pending.22 In twentieth-century Greece, it may well be argued that 
the resistance during the occupation (1941–1944) and, certainly, the Greek civil war (1946–1949) 
were cases of revolution. The National Liberation Front (EAM) was first and foremost a nation-
al liberation movement, which was radicalised and initiated a process of social revolution in the 
countryside through the establishment of its authority and the introduction of social changes. Dur-
ing the civil war, the conflict between the two diametrically opposite camps (the Communist Party 
of Greece (KKE) and the Greek government) concerned the future social and political structure of 
the country; had the KKE prevailed in the civil war, a “people’s democracy” would have been es-
tablished in Greece. In these two different (yet connected) historical circumstances, there were at-
tempts to establish a fundamentally different social and political system by means of mass mobili-
sation. What happened in Greece in the 1940s falls squarely into Skocpol’s classic definition: “social 
revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are 
accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below”.23 However, Greek 
historians have refrained from analysing the resistance and the civil war within the framework of 
a (failed) revolution. Among the few exceptions was Filippos Iliou, who argued that the civil war in 
its “primary structure” was a social revolution.24 In general, the remarkable turn of Greek histori-
ography in recent years to the study of the 1940s was not accompanied by any attempt to examine 
the Greek case within a broader theoretical framework or within a comparative perspective. As a 
consequence, the historiography and the public discussion on the 1940s to a large extent remains 
hemmed in by the question of who or what was responsible for the outbreak of the civil war: for 
some scholars, the rightwing terror gave the left “no other way out” but to resort to arms, while for 
others, the cause of the civil war is to be found in the Leninist ideology of the KKE.
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The 1940s remain a topic in which academic research and politics are inextricably related. Greek 
historians refrained from using the framework of revolution to analyse the 1940s because as a 
concept it was loaded and historically associated with catastrophe and disillusionment – that is, the 
tragic consequences of the civil war and the defeat of the KKE. Moreover, since the 1980s the revo-
lutionary aspects of the resistance were silenced in the construction of a patriotic memory after the 
state’s recognition of the “National Resistance”. Having said that, one has to take into account the 
bigger picture. In recent decades the concept of revolution as a framework for the historical analy-
sis of the 1940s appeared outdated because the political expectations of a radical transformation 
of Greek society has waned amid a growingly individualistic and consumerist society. Revolutions 
became something unthinkable and undesirable. The revolutionary narrative, as Noel Parker has 
brilliantly shown, was at first relocated from Europe to the periphery and then was transferred 
across national boundaries and imported back into Europe (“in a deceptive game of mirrors”) un-
til its collapse in the late twentieth century under the double impact of the ending of revolutionary 
movements in the periphery and the decline of the nation as a specific site for the role of the agent 
in revolution.25 These were the times of a conservative ideological backlash; revolution was dele-
gitimised and was more or less identified with totalitarianism. A similar “displacement” of revolu-
tion can be seen to a certain extent in academia, as for some scholars the study of revolution was 
restricted to the study of the violence of revolutionary agents. 
Yet, revolutions and revolutionary movements are complex social phenomena; they concern struc-
tures and agents, ideas and emotions, resources and availabilities, mechanisms and conjunctures. 
The literature on revolutions and revolutionary movements can be of great significance to the his-
toriography of the Greek civil war by putting forward a synthetic framework of explanation and 
understanding. This frame of analysis can combine the study of state policies (the rapid postwar 
reconstruction of the state mechanism, the repression of leftists, the weak policing capacities in 
mountainous areas that allowed the guerrillas to grow, the dependence of a large part of the pop-
ulation on the distribution of relief and economic aid by the government, etc) with the development 
of a revolutionary movement (the tactics of irregular warfare, the dense organisational network, 
the different dynamics in the countryside and the cities, the mobilisation of disenfranchised groups, 
the lack of resources, etc) and the international context (the decisive intervention of Britain and the 
United States on the side of the government, the ambivalent attitude of the Soviet Union towards 
and the support of Yugoslavia for the Greek communists, cold war perceptions of the Greek situ-
ation, etc). Moreover, the literature of revolutions may enhance our understanding of the revolu-
tionary subject, such as the commitment and discipline of the guerrillas, the familiarisation with 
the culture of armed struggle due to the resistance, the “ruralisation” of communist culture, the 
cult of heroism and self-sacrifice, etc. 
In sum, revolution as a category of analysis, elaborated by social and political scientists in recent 
decades, has moved from the “whys” to the “hows”, from structures to processes, from class to 
culture, and from a state-centred perspective to the study of revolutionary subjects. Some scholars 
use the comparative-historical method, others the microsocial; many political scientists adopted 
rational choice theory, whereas sociologists were influenced by the cultural turn and social move-
ment theories. Thus, there is great diversity in the study of revolutions. It is noteworthy, however, 
that this literature, despite its richness and diversity, does not include the Greek civil war among 








the case studies. At the same time, scholars of the Greek civil war have not taken this literature 
into account. Nonetheless, I think that the category of revolution can be very helpful in the study 
and understanding of developments in Greece in the 1940s, and of the Greek civil war in particular, 
and the relevant literature can provide the necessary broader theoretical and comparative perspec-
tive. Perhaps the Greek civil war can also be a case for a new synthetic approach to revolutions.
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